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The Problem of Presidential Inability-
It Must Be Solved Now
By John D. Feerick
The United States is today in a position where it has no elected
Vice President to succeed President Johnson. Mr. Feerick's
article will interest our readers as he discusses methods to correct
this situation.
N August 27, 1787, John Dickinson of
Delaware asked the Constitutional Con-
vention these vital questions: "What is
the extent of the term 'disability' and who is to
be the judge of it ?" ' His questions regarding
the provision on executive succession were never
answered. Today, one hundred and seventy-six
years later, they remain unanswered. They
have been revived from time to time, usually
when a President has died or become disabled.
Hundreds of answers have been offered. None
has been found acceptable.
Although concern about the problem of presi-
John D. Feerick dential inability had been aroused by the Eisen-
hower illnesses in 1955, 1956 and 1957, interest
had waned to such an extent by "It is a tragic fact that it took a terrible
November 21, 1963 that the prob- crime in Dallas to remind us of a serious
lem was 'all but forgotten by the defect in our constitutional process." 8
Congress and the public. On Since the death of President
November 22, it almost caused a John F. Kennedy, there has been
national crisis. As one reporter .. , ., r +, . 1
then noted:
"For an all too brief hour today, it was
not clear again what would have hap-
pened if the young President, instead of
being mortally wounded, had lingered a
long time between life and death, strong
enough to survive but too weak to
govern." 2
Or, in the words of former Vice
President Richard M. Nixon:
12 The Records of the Federal Conven-
tion of 1787, at 427 (Farrand ed. 1911 and
1937) (hereinafter cited as Farrand),
2 Reston, Why America Weeps. N.Y.
Times, Nov. 23, 1963, p. 7, col. 7.
-l~k li UIbt-~l UA L F _[J U X.The Subcommittee on Constitu-
tional Amendments of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, under the
chairmanship of Senator Birch
Bayh of Indiana, has been conduct-
ing extensive hearings on the sub-
ject. Again, various proposals have
been offered. It remains to be seen
whether one will, this time, be ac-
cepted.
a Nixon, We Need a Vice President
Now, Saturday Evening Post, Jan. 18,
1964, p. 6.
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The problem of presidential in-
ability revolves around Article II,
Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitu-
tion, which provides:
"In Case of the Removal of the Presi-
dent from Office, or of his Death, Resig-
nation, or Inability to discharge the
Powers and Duties of the said Office,
the Same shall devolve on the Vice Presi-
dent, and the Congress may by Law pro-
vide for the Case of Removal, Death,
Resignation or Inability, both of the
President and Vice President, declaring
what Officer shall then act as President,
and such Officer shall act accordingly,
until the Disability be removed, or a
President shall be elected."
This provision is not clear on the
following points: What devolves on
the Vice President? Is it the
"Office" or "the Powers and Duties
of the said Office"? What is the
meaning of "Inability"? Who is
authorized to determine the exis-
tence and termination of an in-
ability?
Some assistance in interpreting
the above provision is provided by
an examination of the proceedings
of the Constitutional Convention of
1787. The first draft of the "suc-
cession provision" of the Constitu-
tion was presented to the Conven-
tion by a Committee of Detail on
August 6, 1787. It provided that
in case of the President's
"removal .... death, resignation, or dis-
ability to discharge the powers and duties
of his office, the President of the Senate
shall exercise those powers and duties,
until another President of the United
States be chosen, or until the disability
of the President be removed." 4
On September 4, a Committee of
Eleven which had been appointed
to study a number of matters, in-
cluding succession, delivered a re-
port to the Convention which
recommended the creation of an
4 2 Farrand at 186.
office of Vice President and the
adoption of a succession provision
which was essentially the same as
that quoted above with the excep-
tions of the substitution of the Vice
President for the President of
the Senate, the inclusion of an
"absence" contingency and the use
of the word "inability" instead of
"disability." 5 On September 7, a
clause providing that the Legis-
lature could declare by law what
officer would act as President in
case of the death, resignation, or
disability of both the President and
Vice President was added to, the
draft.6 Finally, the draft of the
Constitution was referred to a Com-
mittee of Style which was author-
ized only to "revise the style" of and
"arrange" the articles agreed to by
the Convention.7 It was given no
power to effect substantive changes
in the matters submitted to it. On
September 12, this Committee re-
turned a draft of the Constitution
which, except for a few changes,
was to become the Constitution of
the United States. The "succession
provision" as submitted to the Com-
mittee of Style read as follows:
"Sec. 2: [I]n case of his removal as
aforesaid, death, absence, resignation or
inability to discharge the powers or du-
ties of his office the Vice President shall
exercise those powers and duties until
another President be chosen, or until the
inability of the President be removed."
"Sec. 1: The Legislature may declare bylaw what officer of the United States
shall act as President in case of the death,
resignation, or disability of the President
and Vice President; and such Officer
shall act accordingly, until such disability
5 Id. at 493, 495.
6 Id. at 535.
7 Id. at 547, 553. Interestingly, all its
members were lawyers-Alexander Hamil-
ton, William S. Johnson, Rufus King,
James Madison and Gouverneur Morris.
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be removed, or a President shall be
elected." 8
This draft contains the substance
intended by the Founding Fathers.
It makes it absolutely clear that they
intended merely to provide a tem-
porary substitute for the President.
Only the powers and duties were to
devolve on the successor-he was
merely to "act" as President. In no
case, was he to "become" President.
This is further supported by the fact
that the words "shall be elected"
were intentionally chosen so as to
permit a special election. A sug-
gestion to use the words "until the
time of electing a President shall
arrive" had been defeated in favor
of these words.'
There is no clue in the proceed-
ings, however, regarding the in-
tended definition of the word "in-
ability" other than the use of that
particular word in preference to
"disability." The term probably
was intended to be subject to a
broad construction, covering all cir-
cumstances which might cause a
President to be "unable" to dis-
charge the powers and duties of his
office (e.g., mental and physical ill-
ness, coma, kidnaping, wartime cap-
ture, etc. ).
Nor does the Constitution grant
any explicit authority to any in-
dividual or body to make the deter-
mination that a President is "un-
able" to exercise his powers and
perform his duties. However, since
there is an explicit grant of power
in the clause, i.e., to the Vice Presi-
dent (or other successor) to exer-
cise the powers and duties of Presi-
dent under certain circumstances, a
8 Id. at 573, 575. The two sections were
separated from each other in the submitted
draft.9 Id. at 535.
good argument can be made that
the use of that power is at his dis-
cretion and that the only check on
him is the power of Congress to im-
peach him for "high crimes and
misdemeanors." It has been urged
that Congress has, under the
"Necessary and Proper" clause of
the Constitution, the authority to
make whatever laws are necessary
to execute this provision and that
it can, therefore, provide, by legis-
lation, a method for determining
presidential inability.10 However,
since the Supreme Court has held
that this clause is applicable only to
specific grants of power " and since
the only specific grants of power in
question are those of the Vice Presi-
dent (or other successor) to exer-
cise the President's powers and of
Congress to specify what officer
shall act as President when both
President and Vice President are
disabled, any legislation which
would take the determination from
the successor, or even interfere with
his exercise of discretion in the de-
termination, would be of doubtful
constitutionality. 12
The problem of interpreting the
clause was further complicated
when, in 1841, President William
Henry Harrison died in office. His
Vice President, John Tyler, con-
fronted for the first time in our his-
tory with the question of what the
role of the Vice President should be
when a President dies in office,
made a quick decision and, in the
face of heated objection, asserted
his right (by God, the Constitution,
10 E.g., Corwin, The President: Offices
and Powers, 1787-1957, at 54-55 (1957).
11 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 88
(1907).12 See Brownell, Presidential Disability:
The Need for a Constitutional Amendment,
68 Yale L.J. 189, 205 (1958).
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and election, he said) to the office
and title of President.18 He thus
established the precedent that, upon
the death of a President, the Vice
President becomes President for the
remainder of the term. Since the
Constitution provides that "the
Same" devolves in all cases, this in-
terpretation that the "office" de-
volves in cases of death was to cause
havoc when cases of presidential in-
ability occurred in 1881 and 191-9.
President Garfield was shot by an
assassin on July 2, 1881 and
lingered for eighty days between
life and death. Vice President
Arthur, despite the urging of Gar-
field's Cabinet that he act as Presi-
dent, refused to do so for lack of
clear authority to make the deter-
mination that the President was"unable" and for fear that if he did,
he would "become" President, oust
Garfield, and be labeled a usurper.
Thus, the government was, for a
period of nearly three months, in
a state of suspension. When Gar-
field died and Arthur became Presi-
dent, he pleaded with Congress to
find a solution to the problem. But
no proposed solution was found
satisfactory and the problem re-
mained unsolved. 4
In 1919, when President Wilson
suffered a stroke which paralyzed
the left side of his body and was
confined to his quarters by his wife
and doctor who permitted almost no
one to see him, his Vice-President,
Thomas R. Marshall, like Arthur,
resisted the efforts of the Cabinet to
persuade him to discharge the duties
13 See the author's article, The Problem
of Presidential Inability-Will Congress
Ever Solve It?, 32 Fordham L. Rev. 73,
90-93 (October, 1963).
14 For a good account of the period, see
Silva, Presidential Succession, 52-57
(1951).
of the President. He, too, feared
that he had no authority to deter-
mine that the President was "un-
able" and that by acting as Presi-
dent he would become President.
Twenty-eight bills became law by
default of any action by the Presi-
dent. No official Cabinet meetings
took place until April, 1920. Mrs.
Wilson and Dr. Grayson were said
to be running the country. So,
again, nothing was done and the
administration of the country
simply drifted.'"
Eisenhower's heart attack on
September 25, 1955, his ileitis at-
tack on June 8, 1956 and the stroke
causing a speech impairment on
November 25, 1957 revived con-
cern about the possibility of there
being no one authorized to exercise
presidential powe.r during a presi-
dential inability 16 and caused the
President to make a historic agree-
ment with his Vice-President,
Richard M. Nixon, which set out
the following procedures to cover
cases of inability:
"(1) In the event of inability the Presi-
dent would-if possible-so inform the
Vice President, and the Vice President
would serve as Acting President, exer-
cising the powers and duties of the office
until the inability had ended.
"(2) In the event of an inability which
would prevent the President from so
communicating with the Vice President,
the Vice President, after such consulta-
tion as seems to him appropriate under
the circumstances, would decide upon the
devolution of the powers and duties of
the office and would serve as Acting
President until the inability had ended.
"(3) The President, in either event,
would determine when the inability had
ended and at that time would resume the
15 For a good account of the period, see
Hansen, The Year We Had No President,
29-42 (1962).
16 See generally, Nixon, Six Crises, 131-
81 (1962).
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full exercise of the powers and duties of
the office." 17
This agreement was, in turn,
adopted by President Kennedy and
Vice-President Johnson and later by
President Johnson and Speaker
McCormack. 18  It serves a useful
purpose, but it does not provide a
permanent solution to the problem. 9
First, it does not have the force of
law and would have no binding
effect if one or both of the parties
should decide to break it. Second,
it does not extend beyond the term
of the parties involved. Third, it
does not cover the situation where
the successor becomes disabled be-
fore the President. And, finally, it
does not solve the problem created
by the Tyler precedent, i.e., should
the Vice-President become Presi-
dent in cases of inability as well as
in cases of death ?
It is imperative that a solution
which would be both lasting and
constitutional be found now. It
would be tragic if the present oppor-
tunity to solve the problem of presi-
dential inability were lost-and it
may well be lost if no solution is
generally agreed upon before the
next presidential election. A most
significant step in the effort to find
a solution which would be generally
satisfactory was taken in January of
this year by the American Bar Asso-
ciation when it called together in
Washington a group of lawyers
17 White House Press Release, March 3,
1958.18 See letter from Martin Taylor, Chair-
man of the Committee on Federal Constitu-
tion of the New York State Bar Associa-
tion, to New York Times, December 22,
1963.19 Shockingly, the 1947 succession law re-
quires the Speaker to resign as Speaker
and Representative before he could act as
President in a case of inability, even if it
were for only a day.
from different parts of the United
States who represented various
opinions on the problem.2 °
After two days of discussion, the
American Bar Association panel
issued a consensus which included
the following points: First, the
problem can be solved adequately
only by a constitutional amendment.
Second, the amendment must make
it clear that only the powers and
duties devolve in cases of inability
for the duration thereof, while the
office devolves in cases of death, re-
moval and resignation. Third, the
method recommended by the panel
for determining the commencement
and termination of inability was as
follows: Inability would be estab-
lished by declaration, in writing, of
the President. If he were unable
to make known his inability, it could
be established by the Vice-President
with the concurrence of a majority
of the Cabinet (or such other body
as Congress may by law designate).
(By "Cabinet" was meant the heads
of the executive departments.) The
termination of inability would be
established by the President, him-
self, in writing, but if the Vice-
President and a majority of the
Cabinet (or such other body as Con-
gress may designate) did not agree
20 They were: Herbert Brownell, former
Attorney General; Walter E. Craig, Presi-
dent of the American Bar Association;
Professor Paul Freund of Harvard Law
School; Jonathan Gibson, Chicago attor-
ney; Richard Hansen (author of The Year
We Had No President). Professor James
C. Kirby of Vanderbilt University; Ross
L. Malone, former Deputy Attorney Gen-
eral; Dean Charles B. Nutting of George
Washington University Law School; Lewis
F. Powell, Jr., president-elect of the ABA;
Sylvester Smith, Jr., former ABA presi-
dent; Martin Taylor, Chairman of Federal
Constitution Committee of the New York
State Bar Association; Edward L. Wright,
Chairman of the ABA House of Delegates;
and the authior.
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that the President was able to re-
sume his duties, his continued in-
ability could be declared only by a
vote of two-thirds of the members
of each House of Congress. Finally,
the panel recommended that an
amendment provide that any
vacancy in the office of Vice-Presi-
dent be promptly filled through
nomination by the President and
election by a vote of a majority of
the members of Congress meeting
in joint session.
It was felt that a constitutional
amendment was necessary, in part,
because if legislation were passed it
would be prey for attack on consti-
tutional grounds and such attack
would come, most likely, during a
time of inability-when the country
could least afford such attack."
The selection of the Vice-Presi-
dent and Cabinet to make the crucial
decision was based on several
factors: they are close to the Presi-
dent and would not exercise the
power except in a proper situation;
they usually would be aware of the
circumstances of an inability and
thus be in a good position to make
21 The New York State Bar Association
has consistently advocated a constitutional
amendment providing that the powers and
duties devolve in cases of inability and theoffice in all other cases and that "the com-
mencement and termination of any inability
shall be determined by such method as Con-
gress shall by law provide." The panel
consensus was that the method should be
included in the amendment.
a swift decision if necessary; the
public would have confidence in
their decision; they would likely be
of the same party as the President;
and there would be no violation of
the principle of separation of
powers. The Vice-President, act-
ing alone, was rejected on the
ground that he is an interested party
and therefore would likely be too re-
luctant to make a decision if an oc-
casion required it. As for the
President himself having the final
say, as is the case under the existing
agreement, the panel rejected it,
mainly because of the possibility of
a mentally ill President. 22
It is imperative that a workable
solution be agreed upon now. 23 The
problem of presidential inability is
too potentially hazardous a problem
to leave unsolved. As the late
Senator Estes Kefauver said, "The
essence of statesmanship is to act
in advance to eliminate situations of
potential danger." It is hoped that
the Eighty-Eighth Congress will
act !
22 Said the Washington Post: "If there
is still some risk of confusion over presi-dential authority in its formula, we sur-
mise that it is much smaller than the riskin the present arrangement, which makes
it almost impossible to relieve the President
if he should be incapacitated." January 26,
1964.23 For a listing of the various proposals,
see Feerick, op. cit. supra note 13, at 110-
120. [End]
Insincerity
"All the skills of speech are of no use if our words are insincerely
spoken."
Wesley Wiksell, Do They Understand You? (New York: The Mac-
millan Company, 1960), p. 20.
